Volume 36 | Number 2 | Issue 132, Spring/Summer

Article 11

4-15-2018

C.S. Lewis and Christian Postmodernism: Word, Image,
and Beyond. Kyoko Yuasa
Peter G. Epps
[St. Gregory's University]

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.swosu.edu/mythlore
Part of the Christianity Commons, Continental Philosophy Commons, Discourse and Text
Linguistics Commons, and the Literature in English, British Isles Commons
Recommended Citation
Epps, Peter G. (2018) "C.S. Lewis and Christian Postmodernism: Word, Image, and Beyond. Kyoko Yuasa," Mythlore: A Journal of J.R.R.
Tolkien, C.S. Lewis, Charles Williams, and Mythopoeic Literature: Vol. 36 : No. 2 , Article 11.
Available at: https://dc.swosu.edu/mythlore/vol36/iss2/11

This Book Reviews is brought to you for free and open access by the
Mythopoeic Society at SWOSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Mythlore: A Journal of J.R.R. Tolkien, C.S. Lewis, Charles
Williams, and Mythopoeic Literature by an authorized editor of SWOSU
Digital Commons. An ADA compliant document is available upon request.
For more information, please contact phillip.fitzsimmons@swosu.edu.

C.S. Lewis and Christian Postmodernism: Word, Image, and Beyond. Kyoko
Yuasa
Abstract

In C. S. Lewis and Christian Postmodernism, Kyoko Yuasa has managed to advance the cause of careful reading
and discussion of Lewis’s novels as contemporary cultural artifacts, rather than mere ciphers for apologetics or
mere fluff for children, for both Japanese and American audiences. This is no mean feat, not only in terms of
translation but also in terms of trans-Pacific discourse, and Yuasa deserves great credit for the
accomplishment. Her close reading of several of Lewis’s major fiction works in a comparative frame she
derives from works by Iris Murdoch, Muriel Spark, Doris Lessing, and John Fowles yields insights into the
experimental character of much of Lewis’s fiction. Yuasa convincingly suggests that Lewis not only creatively
employed a wide variety of very modern forms to resist both literary and theological Modernism but also
wrestled with and strove to include in his fiction the voices of the powerful women who are so present in his
biography and so conspicuously absent from many discussions of his apologetics. If her claim that the texts
Lewis left us evince a “Christian postmodernism” of which he is a major philosopher ultimately falls flat, it
does so in the grand tradition of English letters, leaving behind like so many arched windows and pavingstones a set of claims that future readers of Lewis will want to contemplate.
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C.S. L EWIS AND C HRISTIAN P OSTMODERNISM : W ORD , I MAGE , AND
B EYOND . Kyoko Yuasa. Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2016. xii+198 pp.
9781498219389. Hbk. $41.00, pbk. $26.00, Kindle $9.99.

I

C. S. LEWIS AND CHRISTIAN POSTMODERNISM, KYOKO YUASA has managed to
advance the cause of careful reading and discussion of Lewis’s novels as
contemporary cultural artifacts, rather than mere ciphers for apologetics or mere
fluff for children, for both Japanese and American audiences. This is no mean
feat, not only in terms of translation but also in terms of trans-Pacific discourse,
and Yuasa deserves great credit for the accomplishment. Her close reading of
several of Lewis’s major fiction works in a comparative frame she derives from
works by Iris Murdoch, Muriel Spark, Doris Lessing, and John Fowles yields
insights into the experimental character of much of Lewis’s fiction. Yuasa
convincingly suggests that Lewis not only creatively employed a wide variety
of very modern forms to resist both literary and theological Modernism but also
wrestled with and strove to include in his fiction the voices of the powerful
women who are so present in his biography and so conspicuously absent from
many discussions of his apologetics. If her claim that the texts Lewis left us
evince a “Christian postmodernism” of which he is a major philosopher
ultimately falls flat, it does so in the grand tradition of English letters, leaving
behind like so many arched windows and paving-stones a set of claims that
future readers of Lewis will want to contemplate.
Yuasa claims “Christian postmodernism” as her own coinage for this
discussion of Lewis, and describes it as “a seemingly unconventional rhetoric
that Lewis must have employed to reach the mindset of the postmodern world”
(2). Although tangled in expression, this description plays well with what most
readers will know of Lewis’s background, aims, and methods in apologetics—
including his very modern insistence that his fiction was neither didactic nor
allegorical, but imaginative. A standard postmodernist account of modernity
argues that the postmodern condition inexorably unfolds from the conditions
and structures of modernity, so that the most successful works of artistic
Modernism are interpreted as overflowing or overloading the boundaries of
Modernism itself. It does make sense, then, to argue that Lewis, as a thoroughly
modern writer uncomfortable with Modernism, employed his familiarity with
the history of literature and philosophy to negotiate a better settlement. Lewis
can then be cast as a “postmodern novelist” and, given his explicit faith and its
inclusion in his works, as a “Christian postmodern novelist.”
When Yuasa stays close to this more modest understanding of
“postmodern” as a negotiation of a better settlement with modernity, her
approach has some merit. Yuasa is at her best when closely reading specific
stories from Lewis, which she keenly appreciates both in themselves and in their
N
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historical and theoretical contexts. In discussing Till We Have Faces, for example,
Yuasa emphasizes Lewis’s “retelling of stories,” arguing that he “extracts the
essence of myths through the process of retelling” (142). She is aware of the
balancing act by which Lewis, both influenced by and reacting against
Bultmannian Biblical criticism, sought to assert the historical factuality of “true
myth” while also arguing, in Neo-orthodox fashion, that not the verifiability of
its history but its ineffably mythic character was the source of its significance.
Thus, although he claims to avoid allegorism, in Yuasa’s words Lewis “uses the
novel as a tool of truth in the same way as mythology” (143). Shakespeare would
be surprised to learn from Yuasa that “story within a story” is a “postmodernist”
approach, but it is true that such disrupted and diverted narrative flows are
characteristic of much modern and postmodern writing. In extreme cases such
as Till We Have Faces, which is not only a multilayered epistolary narrative but
has a false ending and a complicated relationship between the narrator and the
implied audience, such choices beg further explanation.
Yuasa senses that Lewis’s strictures against allegorical readings of his
works cannot easily be applied to Till We Have Faces, and offers methodical
descriptions of the manifestly emblematic characters of the novel—
representatives of the pagan cosmos of the received Psyche and Cupid story,
among others. She peels apart the layers, guiding the reader through the original
story, Lewis’s adaptation of it, and the rhetorical moves his character Orual
makes in retelling it within the story. Yuasa’s sensitivity to the way “Orual
changes herself from [...] an ugly woman, Ungit, to a harmony of both Orual and
Psyche” is valuable, and provides an opening for further reflection on the ways
the experiences and writings of women are reflected and refracted in Lewis’s
writings (146). If phrases such as “the monopoly of multiple roles to the
abandonment of self” are opaque (146), patient readers will often find more
helpful explanations later, such as that “Orual monopolizes all perspectives”
through her extremely privileged initial position and her self-conscious reversal
of status (149). Indeed, Yuasa’s exploration of what seems to be a surprisingly
complex presentation of women’s writing as a model of negotiating spiritual
reality and identity is so interesting that I could seriously wish for a chapter or
more carefully teasing out the extent of Joy Davidman’s influence on Till We
Have Faces that Yuasa tantalizingly mentions in one concluding paragraph (161),
after having suggested the line of inquiry in her introduction (8-9) and framed
up the analysis at length in one section of a previous chapter (57-65).
In Chapter Three, on That Hideous Strength, and Chapter Four, on
Voyage of the “Dawn Treader,” Yuasa provides readings similar to her discussion
of Till We Have Faces in Chapter Five. These readings alone offer plenty of value,
although even here Yuasa would have been better served by tougher editors. In
a middle-voice book based on a doctoral dissertation such as this, the readings
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really should be a great deal more polished and detailed. It is hard to resist the
suggestion that this might have been possible had Yuasa abandoned the attempt
to invent a “Christian postmodernism” such that Lewis can be called, as the title
of Chapter One has it, “Philosopher of Christian Postmodernism.” The critical
and comparative readings in these chapters alone are quite sufficient to support
the more modest and accurate claim that Lewis can meaningfully be read as a
“postmodern novelist” on the basis of similarities between his rhetorical
strategies and those of other novelists called “postmodern,” and a “Christian
postmodern novelist” on the basis of his deployment of those strategies to secure
an opening toward Christian truth that maintains the tension of historical verity
and personal troth. Much of the work of Chapter Two, including the tantalizing
work on the presence of women’s writing in Lewis’s works, would gain
definition and solidity by serving an analysis of Lewis’s writings rather than an
idiosyncratic theory about the anachronistic philosophical project he definitely
never named, and with which he is unlikely to have felt much sympathy.
Nevertheless, the project of defining “Lewis’s concept of Christian
postmodernism” has been attempted, and must be evaluated (2). Yuasa enforces
this upon her readers. It is tempting to take at face value the significant retreat
from her major claim expressed in sentences such as “[Lewis] is an antimodernist philosopher who welcomes postmodern sensibility” (4); there is no
very great difficulty in allowing that a modern writer strategically employing
an array of modern rhetorical strategies in order to find a way past Modernism
is “postmodern” in some meaningful sense. Such a postmodern artistic
sensibility is entirely compatible with an “anti-modernist” philosophical
agenda; noticing it is no stranger than pointing out the affinity between the
works of Hieronymus Bosch and those of Salvador Dali. On the very next page,
however, Yuasa rejects the nuance, averring that “many Lewis scholars [...]
conclude that he is neither modernist nor postmodernist. The reason for their
antipathy is a fear of both thoughts” (5). Indeed, she repeats this delegitimizing
attribution of motive early in Chapter One (14), and it serves as the subtle thread
dividing the “negative” response from “positive voices” who “do not deny the
complicated nature of Lewis’s writings” (6). Setting aside any such fear, then,
and also the fear of giving offence to such a gifted reader of Lewis’s fiction, let
us evaluate Yuasa’s core claim.
Permitted no distinction between “anti-modernist philosopher” and
“postmodern novelist,” there is simply no way to support the thesis that Lewis
is “postmodernist” in any sense Lewis himself might have recognized as part of
his philosophical agenda. Yuasa provides all the evidence needed to reject this
claim in her own arguments and circumlocutions. She is unfortunately not
sufficiently well-versed in modern philosophy, nor sufficiently well-advised by
her “positive voices,” to adjust her claim accordingly. Yuasa begins by
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informing her readers that “the term ‘postmodernism’ was first used in the 1930s
and culturally expanded in the 1960s” (14). (Let the reader look in Volume XII,
Issue 4 of The Hibbert Journal, published in 1914, for an essay titled “PostModernism,” which is not strictly the first usage, but among the first relevant
ones for a discussion of “Christian postmodernism.”) Having adverted to this
history, Yuasa’s discussion of “postmodernism” turns instead on a contest
between various writers from the 1990s and later. She describes a “negative”
view based on Lyotard’s crucial 1979 essay La Condition postmoderne and a
“positive” view that apparently isolates Lyotard’s use of Wittgenstein from his
larger project. She does not, however, offer any understanding of Lyotard’s
discussion of “meta-narratives” and “micro-narratives” except the one she
attributes to those who “negatively interpret the notion of the ‘postmodern’ as
the dethroning of God,” namely, that incredulity toward metanarratives is
“rejection of the traditional values in Europe” (14-15). Of course, Lyotard’s
concern in 1979, 16 years after Lewis’s death, is the enclosure of all human
knowing within computer networks, with the concomitant reduction of human
discourse to a means of optimizing the programming of each human subject in
the interests of a society conceived as a network of functions and datasets. The
metanarratives he discusses are the animating principles of social-science
theories, principally the idea that society necessarily comprises two parts in
conflict (Marxism), which he regards as “traditional theory” (and which has no
obvious relationship to, say, the moral universe of European Christendom).
Yuasa bases her claims on sources who plainly do not understand recent
philosophy, and unfortunately has not done sufficient primary research to
correct them.
As a result of this misplaced trust in sources and her own lack of
understanding of the major sources of postmodern thought, Yuasa leaves her
reader to search for sense in phrases such as “traditional values in Europe [...]
that include dualism, either by science or by absolute belief” or “re-evaluate,
from a Christian perspective, the significance of individual varieties based on
the postmodern philosopher’s phrases that respect multiple opinions” (15).
Presumably this “dualism” is a misunderstanding of Lyotard’s characterization
of traditional (Marxist) theory as regarding social change as the product of class
conflict. Turning the page, one must hope it is simply unhappy phrasing that
has James K.A. Smith affirming “interpretive pluralism within the church” such
that “one (single) world is composed of multiple (plural) factors, as may be seen
in the Trinity” (16). Surely the reader is not meant to conclude that the Trinity is
an example of wordplay, or a composite being? Presumably this sentence results
from confusing the idea that human reception of truth is perspectival (so that
there will always be a plurality of specific affirmations, each of which may be
true in their respective senses) with the understanding that language signs are
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frequently plurivocal, especially when applied to God (whom creatures
necessarily apprehend analogously).
As an evangelical scholar interested in postmodern thought, Yuasa
would profit by a closer examination of Smith’s work, and that of Stanley J.
Grenz, along with a more careful reading of the primary sources of postmodern
philosophy in general. Instead, Yuasa superficially attends to these and then
depends heavily on far weaker interlocutors, like Crystal Downing (who glosses
Derrida phrases without having understood his project), from whom she learns
that “some fear postmodernism on the assumption that taking all truths equally
leads to relativism” (18). Of course, literally attempting to situate all human
truth-claims within some rarefied conception of “truth” or set of claims about
inculturation of meaning such that all such claims can be considered “true” not
only “leads to relativism,” but is relativism itself. Postmodern thinkers differ
about whether relativism is good or bad, and also about whether it is or is not a
necessary result of the historical processes by which modernity came to be.
Nearly all philosophers of any stripe, however, could agree that the assertion “it
is not God but human language which is situated” (18) is mere hand-waving in
the face of the de facto pluralism of modernity and the question of relativism that
arises from it. Similarly, Yuasa’s choice of Louis Markos as her major foil among
Christian Lewis scholars is unfortunate (19); his argument that Lewis is a
staunch anti-modernist (and ipso facto an inveterate enemy of postmodernism)
actually aligns better with her extensive discussion of Lewis’s anti-modern
rhetorical strategies than her own arguments do. His depiction of Saussure and
Derrida is facile, but his argument nonetheless cleaves closer to the actual
sources of postmodern thought than Yuasa ever gets.
Yuasa simply has not grasped the major principles of any of those
thinkers whom disciples and detractors alike recognize as “postmodern
philosophers,” or what it is that causes them to speak of “postmodernity” or a
“postmodern condition.” As a result, she gleans from Downing, especially,
some very strange notions about Lewis’s project. Yuasa relates as Downing’s the
claim that “Lewis deconstructs past models the same way that Thomas S. Kuhn
argues in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962)” (20). This suggestion
would probably startle both Lewis and Kuhn, not least because
“deconstruction” would not enter the vocabulary until several years after Kuhn
published on “paradigm shifts” and Lewis died. Furthermore, while there is an
affinity between Kuhn’s work and Lewis’s, this affinity falls just where they are
both modern: in that they consider major gestalts in human understanding as
essentially similar to the developmental process of an individual. This means
they take as given that there is a continuity of subject (the individual or the
society) and a direction of change (toward a more comprehensive integration of
experience and explanation). What is quite implausible is that Lewis would
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agree that “deconstructs” as Derrida coins the term, or even Heidegger’s
Destruktion, is what Lewis does with regard to philosophy, to theology, or to
“past models.” It is especially the case that Lewis’s The Discarded Image, in
affectionately detailing the Ptolemaic cosmos while admitting that its
elaboration from a phenomenal description of the visible universe required
correction as more accurate science became available, is not accurately described
in the words “He exposes the modernist’s construction of another model, which
he indicates in The Discarded Image: ‘No model is a catalogue of ultimate
realities’” (20).
So while “rehabilitates the values discarded by modernist thought” is
a good description of some of Lewis’s work (1), Yuasa does not help us to clearly
grasp what these are and whether such rehabilitation is characteristic of
postmodern philosophy. Without a clear sense of whether “modernist” means
a typically modern person such as Lewis, a theological Modernist such as Loisy
or Bultmann, or a poetic Modernist such as Eliot or Auden, we cannot begin to
judge the truth of “The term ‘postmodernism’ is generally used to mean the antimodernist movement in and after the 1960s that advocates a multiplicity of
philosophical and cultural notions” (2). Without understanding that, we cannot
make sense of whether “Lewis deconstructs the modernist’s single
interpretation of the truth.” Surely it cannot mean something as adolescent as
“He deconstructs the interpretation commonly accepted by the previous
generation,” for such a deconstruction would fail before it began; such a narrow
tactical objective would simply evacuate the meaning of the term
“deconstruction.” Nor is it possible to defend the assertion that “Lewis
deconstructs the previous interpretations of the text influenced by the cultures
of the time” (3), whatever “text” may be indicated, on the basis of
acknowledgments of changing science in Lewis’s paean to the Ptolemaic cosmos
in The Discarded Image.
Indeed, the reader is left to wonder whether Yuasa finds that the belief
that all learning is inculturated is an objectionable Modernist belief, so that
readers must be freed from “text influenced by the cultures of the time” (3), or
whether it is a desirable postmodernist belief, so that Lewis is to be praised for
being “a promoter of peripheral cultures” (4). Of course, the idea that learning
is deeply inculturated is part of the postmodern inheritance from modernity,
because the postmodern condition is precisely what follows when the social and
technical conditions of modernity do not answer satisfactorily to prevailing
modern descriptions of them; postmodern thought typically argues that
modernity is constantly producing its own excess, overflowing itself, without
having exhausted the impulses which led to those conditions and those
descriptions. (Prominent among these impulses, of course, is the turn away from
the sources of cultural authority inherited from European Christendom, a turn
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dramatized by references to the “death of God” or “the default of God.”) While
modernity’s excesses may be traces of any number of possible understandings
excluded or simplified out in reductive modern conceptual schemes, including
the claims and values of “peripheral cultures,” postmodern philosophy insofar
as it is named by the disciples and detractors of its major thinkers does not find
this significance by an “anti-modernist” gesture that invites “collaboration with
the author to reach an understanding beyond human interpretation” (3). In fact,
the welcome given to “micro-narratives” is precisely conditioned on the
rejection of any such transcendent understanding.
Insofar as Yuasa is right to highlight Crystal Downing’s rejection of one
facile reading of Derrida’s oft-mistranslated «il n’y a pas dehors-texte», then, she
is sorely mistaken to follow Downing to the conclusion that “Derrida resisted
the modernist values along with other post-structural thinkers” (4). What
Derrida did, in collaboration and rivalry with a number who rose to prominence
downstream of Heidegger in the 1960s, was to push the work he inherited from
Heidegger farther than Heidegger did—to be more thorough in delimiting the
enclosure of any possible encounter with Being precisely by ever more
rigorously enforcing the principle that everything understood among beings is
already found in the language of beings—that “there is no ‘beyond the text.’”
Carefully attended to, Derrida is much more interesting than the snarling
destroyer Markos fables forth; but Derrida is definitely not trying to help Lewis
guide anyone to “an understanding that transcends human language” (18). Nor,
we may be confident, would Lewis, the recovering atheistic Idealist with
Boethian and Neo-orthodox affinities, be a likely choice to cooperate with
Derrida in this project.
The confusion nears its peak when Yuasa, again following Downing,
reads the incident of the Tower of Babel as describing “the modernist Christian
world” that “sets up one discourse as an absolute truth for reaching Heaven, so
that they get confused with multiple interpretations in the postmodern world”
(13). The puzzling sentence raises the question of how any “discourse” might
serve “for reaching heaven,” even if one should find a method for evaluating
any “discourse” as “an absolute truth.” Any question of identifying this
“modernist Christian world” with the theological Modernism that Lewis
opposed is, of course, out the window at this point. The absolute apex of the
confusion, however, must be the claim that
Through reading classical literature, including the Bible, Lewis is
possibly inspired by such postmodern approaches as: the Apostle Paul’s
method of speaking within the discourse of the reader, the dialogic
potential of language, the joy of reading in any genre, and the reader’s
participation (7).
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If St. Paul’s rhetoric is postmodern, we may well ask, what is not? The rest is
silence.
Throughout this book, Yuasa demonstrates that she is a careful and
deeply sympathetic reader of Lewis, and insightful when she is reading closely.
Her care for the much-loved novelist, apologist, and Oxford don is worthy of
praise, and her skill in the service of those works and their characters is
exemplary. I would dearly love to read the book she writes about Joy
Davidman’s presence in the text of Till We Have Faces, or more straightforward
comparative work. As for C.S. Lewis and Christian Postmodernism, any Lewis
scholar who is interested in the author’s ongoing popular and critical reception
should add it to the shelf, especially those who identify as evangelicals and
make room for their faith in their scholarship. I would not assign it to a class, as
its conceptual world is confused and the very poor editing makes the book much
easier to nit-pick than I have here represented. It is of no use in serious
discussions of “postmodernism,” except as an example of an idiosyncratic usage
of the term derived from weak philosophical sources; readers not warned about
this are likely to give up on the book before the end of the Introduction. Those
who persist, perhaps encouraged by the very tactfully worded blurbs on the
back, will likely be rewarded with several insights into Lewis’s novels that are
worth the price of admission.
—Peter G. Epps
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EADERS FAMILIAR WITH THE INKLINGS GENERALLY

have some knowledge about
Owen Barfield and his works, which might prompt interest in Michael
Vincent Di Fuccia’s Owen Barfield: Philosophy, Poetry, and Theology. Although it is
not essential for a reader to have prior knowledge about Barfield, it could be
helpful since Di Fuccia’s book is not as much an introduction to Barfield as it is
scholarly insight on Barfield’s theories about philosophy, poetry, and theology.
These subjects can be deep and sometimes difficult to understand, but Di Fuccia
does an admirable job of providing background in each chapter before delving
into weightier analysis. His introduction includes a brief literature review and
outlines the plan of the book with some defined terminology.
With any study of Barfield, it is a given that Rudolf Steiner,
anthroposophy, and the “evolution of consciousness” must be discussed as key
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